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Footnotes
1. See generally, JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE
IN LAW (6th ed., 2005).
2. The Column Coordinator, Brian Bornstein, welcomes comments
from readers and suggestions for topics to be covered in future
columns. They can be directed to bbornstein2@unl.edu or via
phone at (402) 472-3743.
3. See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How
Judges and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002).
4. For overviews of this approach, see, e.g., Edith Greene &
Lawrence Wrightsman, Decision Making by Juries and Judges:
International Perspectives, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL
CONTEXTS (D. Carson & R. Bull eds., 2d ed., 2003) (covering both
trial and appellate court judges); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) (trial); Dan Simon, A Psychological
Model of Judicial Decision Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (1998) (appel-
late); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to
Judges: A Benchmark for Judging? 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469 (2005);
LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE SUPREME COURT
(2006) (appellate). Specific exemplars are discussed infra.
5. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial
Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
6. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992).
This article introduces a new feature for Court Review, “Social Science Research for (and in) the Courts,” thepurpose of which is to summarize recent research on social science topics that judges might encounter. Socialscience research has a long-standing, and sometimes tense, relationship with the law.1 Nonetheless, there are
signs that the courts’ receptivity to social science research is growing. The fields of psychology and the law and eco-
nomics and the law have expanded considerably in the last 20 or so years. Because judges are increasingly likely
to encounter social science issues, the goal of these columns is to provide “state-of-the-art” research summaries in
a non-technical manner. 
In contrast to the standard scholarly publication, the columns will not be heavily footnoted, but they will list a
handful of relevant sources for further reading. As Court Review is the official journal of the American Judges
Association, this inaugural column focuses on an issue that arises frequently in debates about court reform and that
is central to discussions of judicial performance—the nature and extent of differences in judge and jury decision
making.2
JUDGES VS. JURIES
Critics of the jury often assume, explicitly or implicitly, that
judges would in some sense “do better”—that is, reach verdicts
that are more in line with the evidence, be less susceptible to
extralegal influences, and so on.3 There have been relatively
few systematic studies of judicial decision making, perhaps
because of difficulties in recruiting judges as research partici-
pants and the complexity of what judges do. Nonetheless, a
number of social scientists have applied fundamental decision
making models to judicial reasoning, encompassing judges at
both the trial and appellate levels.4 Whether judges’ decisions
differ from juries’ decisions is, of course, an empirical ques-
tion. Most attempts to answer this question fall into one of
three general categories: archival studies of trial verdicts; sur-
veys of judges’ opinions regarding jury trials over which they
presided (often referred to as studies of judge-jury agreement);
and experimental vignette studies in which judges serve as
research participants.
ARCHIVAL STUDIES
Archival studies compile data from a large number of
decided cases to assess the relationship between trial outcome
and various factors, such as characteristics of the judge or
whether the decision maker was a judge or a jury. Gregory Sisk
and colleagues took advantage of a fascinating opportunity to
analyze decisions made by 188 judges concerning essentially
the same legal question, namely, the flurry of cases that posed
constitutional challenges to the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.5 They found that judges’ decisions—and even more so
their reasoning—varied depending on several social back-
ground variables, such as prior employment (e.g., prior expe-
rience as a criminal defense lawyer).
More germane to the question of whether judges’ decisions
differ from jury verdicts, several studies have compared out-
comes in jury versus bench trials. In one of the earliest, and
still one of the best, exemplars of this approach, Clermont and
Eisenberg analyzed a large number of state court trials. They
found that plaintiffs were more likely to win, and recovered
more in damages, when their cases were decided by a judge
than when they were tried before a jury.6 This observation sug-
gests that jurors find civil defendants more sympathetic than
do judges. Such a tendency is at odds with the claims made by
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10. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
11. The exact percentage varies depending on how one treats hung
juries.
12. R. Perry Sentell, The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from
the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85 (1991).
13. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases:
A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171 (2005).
14. Guthrie et al., supra note 4.
7. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 3.
8. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002); Theodore
Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical
Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 1996,
and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006).
9. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital
Cases: Comparing Severity and Variance with Judicial Sentences in
Two States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331 (2005).
many tort-reform advocates that jurors are excessively pro-
plaintiff and anti-defendant. 
A number of more recent studies have focused on judge ver-
sus jury behavior in awarding punitive damages. For example,
Hersch and Viscusi found that juries are more likely than
judges to make extremely large, “blockbuster” awards and
juries’ punitive awards are less strongly related to compen-
satory damages.7 Eisenberg and colleagues, on the other hand,
using similar data sets (but different statistical assumptions)
found that judges and juries award punitive damages at about
the same rate, and the ratio of punitive to compensatory dam-
ages is approximately the same for the two groups.8 Punitive
damage awards by juries were, however, more variable, and the
groups’ respective tendency to award punitive damages varied
depending on case type (i.e., financial vs. bodily injury). Thus,
although archival analyses of punitive damages are somewhat
inconsistent, it is clear that one cannot simply conclude that
one group of decision makers is somehow outperforming the
other.
With regard to criminal trials, there is some evidence that
juries treat defendants more harshly. King and Noble9 found
that in two states (Virginia and Arkansas) that authorize jury
sentencing in non-capital cases, juries meted out more severe
sentences for most offenses. The authors argue that this differ-
ence reflects demographic and attitudinal differences between
judges and jurors less than it shows the influence of procedural
factors, such as greater restrictions on the sentencing options
available to juries.
JUDGE-JURY AGREEMENT
The classic study of judge-jury agreement was conducted by
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, who asked judges in thousands
of cases to report both how the jury decided the case and how
they would have decided if it had been a bench trial.10 In civil
cases, they found an agreement rate of 75-80% as to liability.11
With regard to damages, judges would have awarded more in
39% of cases and less in 52% of cases, resulting in an overall
tendency for judges to favor smaller awards. In criminal cases,
they likewise found an agreement rate of approximately 75%.
Again, however, the disagreements were somewhat asymmetri-
cal: In the majority of cases where judges reported favoring a
different verdict from that reached by juries, juries were more
lenient (i.e., acquitting when judges would have convicted). In
explaining the reasons for these disagreements, judges men-
tioned a variety of defendant characteristics capable of pro-
ducing sympathy:  age (i.e., youth or old age), gender, attrac-
tiveness, remorse, family responsibilities, and occupation (e.g.,
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veterans, police officers, or clergy). Defendants who were rated
as sympathetic engendered a higher disagreement rate than
non-sympathetic defendants.
Kalven and Zeisel’s findings have stood up well under the
test of time. Sentell found that a large majority (86%) of
Georgia superior-court judges reported their agreement rate
with jury verdicts in negligence cases as “about the same” as
Kalven and Zeisel’s,12 and a recent study by Eisenberg and col-
leagues of judge-jury agreement in criminal trials obtained a
virtually identical agreement rate of 75%.13 Although the latter
study found the same sort of asymmetry as the earlier Kalven
and Zeisel study (i.e., judges more likely to convict in cases
where there was disagreement), the pattern was more nuanced,
in that judges were actually more likely than juries to acquit
when judges viewed the evidence favoring conviction as weak,
but they were more likely to convict when they viewed the evi-
dence as medium or strong.
Overall, then, these studies suggest considerable agreement
between judges and juries; yet in the minority of cases where
they do differ, judges could be characterized as somewhat
“tougher”: They would award less in civil cases, and they may
be (depending on the strength of the evidence) more likely to
convict in criminal cases.
EXPERIMENTAL VIGNETTE STUDIES
A number of experimental studies have presented judges
with mock trials and asked them to evaluate the cases and ren-
der hypothetical verdicts. This approach, which has much in
common with the jury-simulation literature, sacrifices the
complexity and realism of an actual trial to obtain greater
experimental control. The nature of the method affords a com-
parison between judges and laypeople (mock jurors), either
directly, as part of the same study, or indirectly, where similar
studies of laypeople have been performed.
The most comprehensive such study, conducted by Chris
Guthrie and colleagues, assessed whether judges were suscep-
tible to five different “cognitive illusions” to which laypeople
(including jurors) are generally susceptible: anchoring (mak-
ing estimates based on normatively irrelevant starting points,
such as an ad damnum); framing (treating economically equiv-
alent gains and losses differently); hindsight bias (perceiving
events to have been more probable after one knows the event
has occurred, also referred to as the “knew-it-all-along” effect);
the representativeness heuristic (undervaluing relevant back-
ground statistical information, or base rates); and egocentric
biases (overestimating one’s own abilities).14 They found that
judges were just as susceptible as laypeople to three of the five
15. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in
Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (1994); Andrew J.
Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately
Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
16. Ebbe B. Ebbesen & Vladimir J. Konecni, Decision Making and
Information Integration in the Courts: The Setting of Bail, 32 J. PERS.
& SOC. PSYCH. 805 (1975).
17. Shari S. Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial
Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73 (1989).
18. Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision-Making about General Damages:
A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751
(1999) (non-economic damages); Jennifer K. Robbennolt,
Punitive Damage Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and
Trial Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002) (punitive
damages). There is some indication that, when judges and juries
do differ in civil cases, jurors award greater damages. Wissler et
al., supra; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30  J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (2001).
illusions; they were less susceptible to the other two (framing
and representativeness), though they were still not completely
immune to their effects.
Other studies have obtained generally comparable results.
Judges, like most people, are not very successful at ignoring
information they have been told to disregard,15 and they actu-
ally make decisions based on factors other than those that they
believe influence their decisions.16 Conflicting with the results
of King and Noble’s archival analysis, at least one experimental
study has found that judges tend to be somewhat harsher than
mock jurors (to the extent that they differ at all) in criminal
sentencing.17 With respect to civil cases, vignette studies have
demonstrated that trial-court judges and jury-eligible citizens
behave quite similarly: They rely on more or less the same fac-
tors, and award roughly comparable amounts, in both non-
economic and punitive damages.18 Consistent with the archival
studies, mock juror awards do tend to be more variable.
CONCLUSIONS
These methodologies differ in a number of important
respects. For example, studies of judge-jury agreement and
vignette studies compare jury verdicts with judges’ opinions
for the same cases, whereas archival studies compare verdicts
in cases tried by juries to verdicts in similar, yet still completely
different, cases tried by judges. Thus, it is possible that the
cases tried before juries and judges are in some respects fun-
damentally different. For example, lawyers and litigants might
base the decision of whether to have a bench or a jury trial on
subtle case characteristics, or they might choose to present dif-
ferent kinds of evidence depending on who the fact-finder is.
Moreover, each method suffers from its own particular limita-
tions: Archival studies can suffer from incomplete verdict
reporting, experimental studies lack consequences for the par-
ticipants and fail to embody the complexity of real trials, and
judges offering post hoc opinions on a jury trial they oversaw
might display retrospective memory bias or feel pressure to
validate the jury’s verdict. 
On the other hand, the advantage of these multiple method-
ologies is that they potentially offer convergent validity, mean-
ing that if different methods all point to the same general find-
ing, then it is unlikely that the finding is limited to the particu-
lar circumstances of any single approach. With respect to the
question of whether judges and juries differ, the research sug-
gests that although there are some differences, the overall pat-
tern of decision making is quite comparable for the two
groups. On the whole, judges’ decision making adheres to the
same psychological principles as jurors’ decision making; they
are much more similar than they are different, including their
susceptibility to errors in reasoning. Moreover, any discrepan-
cies might reflect countervailing tendencies. For example,
most evidence suggests that judges are more likely to convict,
but there is also some indication that they award less severe
sentences than juries. Thus, there might be reasons for prefer-
ring a jury or a bench trial for certain types of cases (e.g.,
depending on the strength of the evidence, the nature of the
injury, etc.), but an expectation that one or the other will reach
a “fairer,” “better,” or “more favorable” verdict does not appear
to be among them.
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